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The Institutional Framing of Policy Debates: 






By framing the economics versus environment debate as a mixed-motive situation, opportunities 
become visible which allow greater benefits to all interests in the debate.  Yet, social, cultural 
and institutional arrangements frame how we see these opportunities, creating a barrier to mixed-
motive analyses.  In this paper, we will use an institutional perspective to analyze how the 
economics versus environment debate emerges from institutions as presently structured.  We will 
present an analysis of its present framing based on three aspects of institutions — regulative, 
normative and cognitive — and consider the prescriptive implications they expose at the 
managerial and organizational level of action.  We conclude with an analysis of possible 






“There is some very good news about the climate problem: we do not need to worry about how 
the climate science turns out or whether this is a real problem or not...because we ought to do 
the same things about it anyway just to save money...The obstacles to achieving this profitable 
resolution are not technological or economic. Rather, they are cultural and procedural... 
Obsolete rules-of-thumb used throughout engineering practice are typically wrong by half to one 
order of magnitude compared with whole system life-cycle optimization, because they’re 
optimizing a little piece of the system and therefore pessimizing the whole system.  Most of our 
building design is “infectious repetitis,” not real engineering or architecture at all – partly 
because architects and engineers are rewarded for what they spend, not for what they save.  
Similarly our utilities, in almost every jurisdiction, are rewarded for selling more energy and 
penalized for cutting your bill.  We have split incentives between builders and buyers of 
equipment or buildings, and between landlords and tenants.”  (Lovins, 1997: 146, 195). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policies work as theories:  they comprise implicit accounts of both the cause and the 
solution to issues of collective concern (Majone, 1981) and so, can enable us to understand the 
working assumptions of the system that generated the policy.  Policy debates, on the other hand, 
are grounded in the interplay of the interests and institutional context of their formation (March 
& Olson, 1984).  Lovins (above) reminds us that the form of the debate over environmental 
issues such as climate change is determined by who is engaged in that debate, what interests they 
invoke in forming it, and how these shift and evolve across time.  Lovins’ insight is to recognize 
the possibilities of better outcomes, by looking beyond conventional practice and ideology;  our 
challenge is to imagine how this can be accomplished.   
In this paper, we draw from recent theory and empirical research in studies of 
organizational fields, policy cultures, and institutional change to develop an understanding of 
how policy debates take a particular shape — which actors are engaged, what kinds of problems 
are debated, how those problems are defined, and what kinds of solutions are considered 





as struggles between competing frames of meaning, embodied within competing interests and 
identities.  Where other chapters in this issue develop mechanisms at the level of the individual, 
we direct our attention at debate and activity at the level of the field, incorporating cultural 
analysis to what might otherwise seem like problems of individual biases, information 
asymmetries, political manipulation and strategic avoidance. 
Our institutional and cultural analysis provides a multi-level diagnosis of the institutional 
barriers that confront academics, policy-makers, business executives, and activists who want to 
participate in social issue debates, such as that between economics and the environment 
(Hoffman, Gillespie, Moore, Wade-Benzoni, Thompson & Bazerman, 1999).  We will elaborate 
how institutions structure policy debates with consequences for their initial framing and the 
practical work of finding and implementing integrative solutions.  While we note the 
conventional attention to institutions as sources of constraint and inertia, we also focus on 
emerging conceptions of institutional elements that support change within the context of the 
debate. As such, we will apply our theories to analyzing specific empirical examples of 
institutional barriers to the reconfiguration of the economics versus environment debate and 
present an assessment of conceptual and practical mechanisms to overcome them. 
 
AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE  
ECONOMICS VERSUS ENVIRONMENT DEBATE 
Annual costs for pollution control in the US rose from $27 billion in 1972 to more than 
$90 billion in 1990, and are projected to reach $155 billion by the year 2000 (Pendleton, 1992).  





disagreement that environmentalism affects corporate management, altering profit and loss 
statements and influencing both domestic and international strategy.  Yet, while many within 
industry and government are vilifying environmentalism as a threat to economic growth, others 
are taking advantage of the economic opportunities it can reveal.  The Carrier Corporation 
invested $500,000 to eliminate the use of toxic solvents in the manufacture of air conditioners.  
By the end of one year, it had recouped $1.2 million in reduced manufacturing costs (Wall Street 
Journal, 1990).  DuPont undertook a $500 million capital improvement plan at three North and 
South Carolina plants, which will reduce air emissions by 60 percent and increase production by 
20 percent (Engineering News Record, 1991).   
Why do some see a synergy between economic and environmental objectives while 
others see only a threat?  Is the relationship between economics and the environment inherently 
win-win, win-lose or mixed motive (Hoffman et al., 1999)?  Recent work on organizations and 
the environment might approach these questions with a focus on the strategic actions of 
individual firms (e.g. Lawrence & Morell, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995; Lober, 1996).  For example, 
Hart (1995: 986) advances a “theory of competitive advantage based upon the firm’s relationship 
to the natural environment.”  Porter and van der Linde (1995: 114) argue that “companies must 
start to recognize the environment as a competitive opportunity.”  These lines of work are 
important for their emphasis on the interaction of organizational decision-making with the 
natural environment.   
However, they are incomplete to the degree that they neglect the cultural and institutional 
contexts in which such decisions are made. Firms are not autonomous units, able to develop and 





institutional arrangements and social processes are central to the formulation of both individual 
and organizational action (Orrù, Biggart & Hamilton, 1991).  Organizations, and managers 
within them cannot choose from an unlimited range of possible strategies.  Rather, they choose 
among a narrowly defined set of legitimate options.  These options are bound by institutions.  
Institutional theory asks questions about how these social choices are shaped, mediated and 
channeled by the external (institutional) environment. 
So, in addressing the question of whether the relationship between economics and the 
environment is inherently win-win, win-lose or mixed-motive (Hoffman et al., 1999), we focus 
on the institutional basis for the question’s initial framing.  How are wins and losses defined?  
Who defines them?  If trade-offs between economic and environmental interests are necessary to 
uncover mixed-motive solutions, whose economic and environmental interests are legitimate in 
this equation?  In essence, the questions to which the institutional perspective directs us are:  
Why is the economics versus environment debate framed as it is?  And, who is influential in 
framing it?  With the answers to these questions, we can begin to deconstruct the debate and 
reconstruct solutions to it.  To organize our analysis, we will explain (1) institutions in general, 
(2) a three aspect structure for understanding them and (3) an explanation for how these three 
aspects can help us understand both inertia and change. 
 
Institutions 
Institutions (Scott, 1995) are central in the basic framing of the environment and 
economics relationship.  They present cultural and contextual constraints which alter individual 





of the structural elements — actors and meanings — in the policy field around which the issue is 
debated. In this way, the entire debate as well as the form of its solutions are based, not within 
the strategic, technological or economic arena, but within the social, cultural and institutional 
arena (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999).  While strategic, technological and economic activity may 
be the direct cause of or solution to environmentally destructive behavior, it is the cultural norms 
and societal institutions out of which that activity emerges that are important (David, 1985; 
Barley, 1986; Smith & Marx, 1994). The institutional approach directs us to consider the 
interplay of varied organizational actors, and the contending institutional logics, authority 
structures, and conflicts that occur among them to understand the shape of the policy debates 
(Ventresca & Washington, 1998). 
Institutional influences devolve from a field of actors and comprise symbolic elements, 
networks, technology, material resources, and historical remnants of prior practice and decisions 
(Scott, 1983).  In fact, the mixed-motive framework on which the intellectual imagery of this 
volume is grounded explicates the fact that normatively rational action is complicated by social 
and cultural processes.  The very nature of the apparent tradeoffs or mixture of motives in the 
mixed-motive framework is an outcome of institutionally robust processes.  Conceptions of the 
value of nature, the responsibility of the corporation toward protecting it and, the economic costs 
associated with such efforts are all mediated by social, cultural and institutional context. While 
the mixed-motive framework presents strong arguments for the possibility of finding optimal 
outcomes in policy debates through a process of clarifying interests, incorporating information, 
and treating decisional outcomes as modular (in ways that unbundle and rebundle preferences in 





and meaning in each of these action steps (Scott, 1995). 
 
Three Aspects of Institutions 
Scott (1995) distills theory and empirical research on institutions into three foundational 
pillars: regulative, normative, and cognitive aspects.  Regulative aspects of institutions are based 
upon legal sanction to which organizations accede for reasons of expedience.  Normative aspects 
of institutions are morally grounded, to which organizations will comply based on social 
obligation.  Cognitive aspects of institutions reference the collective constructions of social 
reality via language, meaning systems, and other rules of classification embodied in public 
activity.  We note that cognitive aspects are not limited to individuals; rather they recognize the 
role of social classification and cognitive as elements of everyday social reality.  It is this aspect 
that emphasizes the taken-for-granted beliefs to which the organization will attend out of habit, 
convention, or obligatory action (Zucker, 1983). 
We follow theorists (Scott, 1995) and other commentators (Hirsch, 1997) in treating the 
three aspects of institutions as analytically distinct while practically and operationally 
intertwined in practical activity.  But we wish to elaborate a key insight that institutions 
comprise all three aspects, in differing mixes and with diverse implications for change processes 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  For example, regulative institutions are often described as 
embodied within regulations, protests, lawsuits, political lobbying and stakeholder negotiation; 
and normative institutions are described as emerging through universities, professional training 
institutions and trade associations and manifested in occupational standards, educational 





elements of all three institutional aspects.  For example, while government regulations may form 
a visible embodiment of the regulative aspects of institutions, they are actually supported by 
normative and cognitive aspects that form the basis and philosophy behind their purpose and 
meaning.   
 
Institutional Inertia and Change 
The power of the three institutional aspects is in explaining how institutions first restrain 
and second change organizational activity.  The notion that institutions act as “constraints” rests 
on the view that existing polices and institutions confine the ability of actors to respond to and 
solve their problems once they have been articulated.  The three aspects help to delineate 
mechanisms by which this occurs.  More contemporary institutionalist arguments focus on the 
source of that articulation, exploring how actors define political and economic problems that 
confront them and the policy and institutional solutions available to them (Campbell, 1998).  
Institutional context provides “rationalized building blocks” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) — 
modules of social reality available for assembly into organizational forms and structures.  
Institutional rules form prescriptions about how society works or should work and define the 
meaning and identity of the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity 
(Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1987).  This claim emphasizes the generative aspects of institutions — 
how authoritative social rules do not simply describe but actively generate and confirm social 
and economic realities.  The three aspects help to delineate the forms of this generation process, 
whether through coercion, education or connection to accepted beliefs.  In short, institutional 





and actions of organizational actors.  As such, institutional processes become central in 
constituting and constraining the elements of economic action.   
This view of institutional processes reshapes the questions we ask about how institutions 
change in the environment and economics debate.  What is distinctive about the evolution of 
policy, regulation, and organizational strategy is the dramatic redefinition of the linkages 
between environmental and economic goals (Hoffman, 1997).  We provide here a framework 
within which to understand how policy regimes and fields of activity can be reconstructed.  The 
three aspects become the basis for understanding how efforts to solve the policy dilemma can 
follow two possible paths. 
First, change efforts can focus on pragmatic action that works within the existing 
framework of the debate as given.  In this way, competing interests are reframed in terms 
consistent with those interests that dominate.  For example, in the economics versus environment 
debate, environmental issues can be reframed to fit within the dominant economic framework of 
the social and political system.  They can be reconstructed as an economic opportunity, such that 
a merge of interests reduces tension in the debate and exposes mixed-motive opportunities for 
conflict resolution.  Second, change efforts can focus on efforts to restructure the existing 
framework and thereby identify entirely new possibilities for action.  In this way, existing 
institutions are exposed and restructured to support a new set of beliefs and actions.  In either 
case, institutional approaches remind us of the several analytic levels that interact to frame and 
reinforce current definitions of “what’s at stake.”   Further, the three aspects expose where 






THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMING OF THE  
ECONOMICS VERSUS ENVIRONMENT DEBATE 
“...every past generation has had to disenthrall itself from an inheritance of truisms and 
stereotypes...For the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie — deliberate, 
contrived, and dishonest — but the myth — persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic...We 
subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations.”  (John F. Kennedy, 1962). 
As Kennedy points out, institutions form enduring truisms, stereotypes, clichés, and 
myths which give shape to policy debates and create perceptions of social and economic reality 
that are ambiguous, negotiated, and contested.  As such, they can act as restrictions by keeping 
policy discussions anchored in assumptions and models that work against integrative problem 
solving.  In this section, we consider how some of those barriers have taken shape.  While not an 
exhaustive list, we will explore the institutional constraints embedded within four empirical 
arenas:  environmental standards, educational curricula, engineering and operational practice, 
and international regimes.  Whether we are discussing these areas or one of the many other 
institutional elements that shape the present configuration of the environment versus economics 
debate, we argue that each can be analyzed in terms of the regulative, normative and cognitive 
aspects that ground its specific standards and criteria, key assumptions, and underlying beliefs 
(Scott, 1995).  In each case, we will illustrate mechanisms by which institutional processes 
contribute to the social definition of the apparent trade-off in the policy debate.   
 
Environmental Standards.   
Standards form the most apparent source of pressure for organizational action in 





by threat of penalty.  But standards are also symbolic, uncertain, contested and constitutive.  
Courts frequently measure compliance against “industry standards,” “business necessity” or “the 
limits of current technology.”  While we can consider standards in terms of their regulative 
aspects, we must also consider how they are supported by contending logics and project 
symbolic activity (Powell, 1996).  Edelman (1990), for example, shows how abstract legal 
mandates are typically enacted in organizational practices via mechanisms of translation and 
adaptation based on these supporting normative and cognitive institutions.   
The present regulatory structure in the US is founded on fundamental beliefs about the 
nature of pollution and the appropriate methods for eliminating it.  Dating from the formative 
days of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, these beliefs, values, and practices 
contribute to a stable policy paradigm.  Three components of this regulatory culture are 
particularly important for our discussion. 
First, the regulatory structure is based on a perception of environmental issues as 
compartmentalized by media — air, water, pesticides, radiation, solid waste, etc.  While 
obviously inaccurate as a framework for understanding the inherently trans-media nature of 
pollution, this conception is perpetuated by a formal organizational structure within the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that is an artifact of its early formation.  While many 
advisors to the agency’s first administrator recommended an “intermedium” approach which 
would have regulated an industrial facility as a unit, considering the impact of its operations on 
the environment as a whole, political realities forced the creation of the new agency through the 
consolidation of the existing departments scattered through the federal government.  These 





structured.  But, this structure institutionalized a framework that inhibits creative environmental 
problem solving by focusing on partial solutions. 
A second aspect of the regulatory structure that institutionalizes a particular conception 
of environmental issues is its “command-and-control” format.  Many in 1970 felt that once 
government set standards and began to enforce them, industry would fall in line and the 
environmental problem would essentially disappear (US Environmental Protection Agency, 
1993).  During the first 60 days, EPA brought five times as many enforcement actions as the 
agencies it inherited had brought during any similar period (Landy, Roberts, & Thomas, 1990).  
This focus on punishing polluters was justified on political grounds to establish credibility, but it 
also set the adversarial type of industry/government relationship that carries over to today.  This 
adversarial relationship supports a belief that government regulators and industry decision-
makers cannot find solutions that offer mutual gain. 
Finally, a third aspect of the original EPA that forms our institutionalized beliefs about 
the relationship between economics and the environment is the focus on the technological-fix 
solution to environmental problems.  Since the 1970s, regulations have been based on 
prescripted, technology-based standards.  The catch word for the early 1970s was “technology-
forcing,” where new federal rules would force industry to use new pollution free technology and, 
as new plants replaced old, eventually the problem of pollution was expected to disappear 
(Novick, 1986).  Today, that mindset is manifested in regulations that prescribe “best 
demonstrated available technology” (BDAT) for specific environmental problems across 
disparate industries. 





technology based approach to environmental regulation came to provide a standard approach to 
understanding the nature of environmental issues, regulatory solutions, and the “inherent” policy 
trade-offs among government, industry and activist communities.  These are the regulative and 
normative aspects of the institutions of environmental standards.  Many now view this paradigm 
as out of date and overly restrictive of corporate environmental initiatives beyond compliance 
(Schmitt, 1994).  But to change them will require alterations in their cognitive aspects.  
While government standards have historically produced results consistent with broad 
environmental objectives (Easterbrook, 1995), some are beginning to argue that the existing 
standard and enforcement programs may be the biggest challenge faced by environmentalists 
today.  While they can force behaviors that are easily monitored by oversight agencies, they 
perpetuate perceptions about the relationship between economics and the environment that may 
be contrary to the goals of both.   They are based on cognitive institutions which perpetuate the 
view that economic and environmental interests are mutually exclusive.   
Tenbrunsel and colleagues (1997) argue that legal standards lock organizations into a 
focus on strict legal compliance rather than the attainment of environmental goals or more subtle 
societal interests.  They suggest that decision makers may evaluate sub-optimal choices (both 
economically and environmentally) that adhere to a standard more highly than optimal choices 
that violate the standard.  Once standards are written, program managers within both government 
and corporations become constrained by a compliance mindset and bureaucratic procedures, 
which attenuate the search for creative solutions to complex environmental problems.  Standards 
direct attention and embody a theory of cause, effect, and solution which is often received as 





what extent, and with which technologies across a broad spectrum of disassociated industries.  It 
often ignores the technological and logistical issues associated with overlapping regulatory 
programs as well as the multi-media and multi-objective impacts of a particular rule of policy 
(Raffle & Mitchell, 1993).  At times, standards can explicitly restrict environmentally optimal 
solutions.  For example, the permitting requirements under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) often restrict hazardous waste recycling initiatives by strictly imposing 
regulation on those wastes once created.  Any company that creates hazardous wastes and then 
attempts to recycle or reuse them will be required to obtain a hazardous waste “Part B” permit 
for treatment of a hazardous waste, an extremely expensive and time consuming process (Byers, 
1991).  In the eyes of many corporate managers, such as Thomas Zosel, manager of 3M’s 3P 
program, “RCRA permits are so extensive and expensive to develop that many companies forego 
recycling to cut all the regulatory hassle required by RCRA” (Ember, 1991).   
Tenbrunsel et al. (1997) also suggest a motivational explanation for the “misdirected 
attention” effect, namely that standard-based systems can change the incentive systems for 
individuals and promote self-interested behavior at odds with wider societal interests 
(Tenbrunsel et al., 1997).  Sub-optimal outcomes are the product of both unintentional and 
intentional actions on the part of a decision maker, within the context that frames incentives and 
defines options.  Unintentional actions may result from individuals “just following the rules,” 
creativity not being rewarded, a “use it or lose it” rationale, intrinsic motivation being replaced 
with extrinsic motivation, or a “no law against it” mentality.  Intentional actions include trying to 
“beat the system.”  For example, the EPA listed n-methyl pyrrolidone (NMP) in 1995 as one of 





adhesives industry for chlorinated solvents.  It is non-flammable, practically non-volatile, and 
80-90% recyclable.  The listing was prompted by a single study citing a potentially remote health 
effect.  Many companies decided to revert back to flammable and volatile (but non-reportable) 
solvents in order to avoid the reporting burden of NMP.  The end result of the NMP listing 
requirement was a reversion to a less safe and potentially more environmentally harmful option. 
As we noted earlier, standards are supported by contending logics and project symbolic 
activity.  To alter the meaning behind environmental standards and the tensions that exist 
between such mandates and the organizational processes (Edelman, 1990; Mezias, 1995), we 
must change the normative and cognitive institutions upon which they are based.  In essence, a 
standard is an artifact of the wider regulatory cultures, structures, and traditions from which it 
originates.  But existing cognitive aspects of such standards are anchored in the constellation of 
beliefs, organizational routines, policies and practices that have accumulated over thirty years of 
organizational and programmatic routines and have defined the nature of environmental 
problems and the form of their solution.  Breaking down such structures will require attention to 
their regulative aspects which are influenced by direct political control, but also their cognitive 
aspects which perpetuate a practical conception of the nature of environmental problems that 
counterpose environmental sense to economic competitiveness.   
 
Educational Curricula. 
The content of educational curricula, professional association strategies, and industry 
standards and best practices also provides a basis for institutionally-grounded inertia in policy 





institutions, their full effect on the economics versus environment debate must also consider the 
deeper meaning embedded in their cognitive aspects.  Looking first at the most explicit level of 
programmatic training programs, one can see institutionalized notions of environmental 
problems.  
For example, undergraduate chemical engineering education often overlooks waste 
considerations in the economic calculations of chemical plant design.  Marked as an arrow 
aiming off the page and labeled “to waste” students are systematically taught to ignore their 
associated costs and opportunities to reduce them at the source.  Business management education 
treats environmental issues as an issue of “socially responsible business” and outside the rubric 
of core decision-making logic (Hoffman, 1999b).  A survey of US business schools found that 
“only 16 percent of schools report integrating environment into core or departmental 
requirements, thus only a few MBAs truly receive environment-business training” (Finlay, 
Bunch & Neubert, 1998: 2).  And finally, economic education treats environmental protection as 
an “externality” from the market (Cropper & Oates, 1992), the consequence of an absence of 
prices for certain scarce environmental resources, such as clean air and water. 
These are the regulative and normative aspects of institutions within this social arena.  
But educational curricula transcend such normative rules and procedures, being built on 
culturally supported beliefs about the nature of professional life and the place of the environment 
within it.  Through each of the educational curricula described above, economic and 
environmental interests are conceived as separate and distinct.  In such a framework, the 
potential for innovative mixed-motive agreements are not possible.  The cognitive aspects of 





environmental protection and that decision-makers will never find it in their own economic 
interests to incorporate environmentally sensible policies. 
Historians and environmental management experts (Merchant, 1980; Gladwin, Freeman 
& Kennelly, 1994; Allenby, 1998) now argue that the contemporary ideologies of educational 
training (and capitalism more broadly) rest on fundamental cognitive assumptions that 
perpetuate a disconnect between environmental and economic sustainability.  In the pursuit of 
economic progress, organizations and individuals are depicted as independent actors, bartering 
and trucking in a market without social structure, where resource extraction and development are 
the right of the property-owner to the exclusion of other stakeholder interests and unlimited 
progress is possible through the exploitation of nature’s infinite resources.  Scholars in the 
environmental management community challenge present management theory and practice for 
supporting these beliefs by promoting an uncritical belief in: (a) the necessity of increasing 
economic growth; (b) the perception of nature as a limitless sink; (c) the superiority of 
technological development for controlling natural systems; (d) the social and physical autonomy 
of the firm; and (e) the profit-motive as a singular objective of the firm (Capra, 1982; Daly, 
1991; Daly & Cobb, 1994; Gladwin, Kennelly & Krause, 1995).  These cognitive aspects of 
educational curricula lie at the center of notions about what is the role of the business manager 
and the engineer in interacting with the environment and what is the role of the academy in 
training them for that role. 
 
Engineering and Operational Practice. 





relationship between economics and the environment.  These can be the product of 
environmental standards or educational curricula, but they can also be perpetuated through 
regulative and normative institutions embedded within specialized units, habits, routines, and 
technical practices within organizations.  These structural elements of individual organizations 
are representative of cognitive aspects of institutions which support a divisonalization of 
“environmental” and “economic” responsibilities within the framework of organizational 
decision-making.  Over the past twenty-five years, corporations have developed specialized 
environmental, health and safety departments to handle the command-and-control system of 
environmental regulation.  Through force of habit, tradition and power, this separation of 
responsibilities has created a cultural and institutional schism among business units and 
objectives within the corporation (Shelton & Shopley, 1995) and the wider debate over their 
relationship.  The two cultures are divided by objectives, language and external constituencies.  
For example, environmental managers are responsible to government regulators and often 
support their initiatives with non-business acronyms such as notice of deficiency (NOD), 
environmental impact statement (EIS), biological oxygen demand (BOD), and life cycle 
assessment (LCA) which may be familiar with this external constituency but serve to distance 
other business managers from environmental matters (Shelton & Shopley, 1995).  These other 
business managers are focused on customers and shareholders and use terms such as return on 
investment (ROI), net present value (NPV) and return on assets (ROA) to justify their initiatives. 
  While these metrics remain the most common business validation metric, most environmental 
managers do not acknowledge such economic cost-benefit analyses when attempting to gain 





Operations personnel are not the only organizational tier at which institutionalized beliefs 
about the relationship between economics and the environment are perpetuated.  In a survey of 
corporate managers about the primary obstacles to industrial expenditures on environmental 
programs, many placed the accounting department at the top of the list (Hoffman, 1992).  
Environmental protection costs are generally listed as a liability and not an asset on balance 
sheets, even if the expenditure resulted in decreased compliance and disposal costs, or savings in 
other areas such as improved public relations, or liability and regulatory reduction.  Further, 
individual managers are often shielded from incentives to seek more efficient solutions to 
environmental problems as environmental costs are lumped together as overhead costs, not for 
the department but for the corporation. 
Institutionally maintained norms and rules in the form of standard operating procedures, 
best engineering practice or established rules of thumb support deeper assumptions about the 
relationship between economics and the environment.  Accepted financial objectives are often 
based on cognitive assumptions that undervalue environmental resources, discount the future and 
uncritically favor economic over environmental objectives (Schmidheiny, 1996).  For example, 
return on investment criteria must support the debt-load expected by lending institutions and 
corporate investors.  But financial markets have payback horizons that are not in sync with the 
long term time horizons of ecological systems.  For forestry companies, such economic pressures 
will lead them to diminish the natural capital asset base upon which their long term success is 
based, harvesting timber at rates that exceed maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  The short term 
economic interests of financial markets take precedent over long term environmental cycles.   





economic progress.  It is a measure of all financial transactions for products and services, but it 
does not acknowledge (nor value) a distinction between those transactions that add to the well-
being of a country and those which actually diminish it.  This creates perverse economic signals 
that promote short-sighted economic activity at the expense of environmental objectives 
(Redefining Progress, 1996).  For example, GDP treats the depletion of natural capital as 
income, rather than the depreciation of a capital asset.  The more a nation depletes its natural 
capital base and with it, its ability to produce income in the future the more its GDP will go up.  
GDP treats natural disasters as economic gain.  Hurricane Andrew, for example, was a disaster 
for Southern Florida, but GDP recorded it as a $15 billion boost for the economy due to recovery 
programs.  Finally, GDP increases with polluting activities and then again with pollution clean-
up (Redefining Progress, 1996).  For example, through the century, economic activity and GDP 
have increased through the low cost and inappropriate disposal of hazardous wastes.  Now, under 
the aegis of the Superfund program, it is estimated to cost $750 billion to clean them up (Russell, 
Colglazier & Tonn, 1992) which will again be added to GDP.  As a result, pollution becomes a 
double benefit for the economy and the true relationship between economics and the 
environment becomes clouded. 
Any attempts to seek alternative solutions within the business organization, such as 
integrative negotiated agreements, may represent a challenge to these taken-for-granted beliefs 
of business and engineering practice.  Integrative solutions require a joint problem solving effort 
that relaxes the organizational structure and allows interaction among different functions 
(Hoffman, 1996).  Yet, the functional differentiation of organizational responsibilities may 





perception that economic and environmental objectives are separate and distinct would be 
perpetuated within measures of performance, process criteria, and outcomes used to assess 
corporate health and success (Meyer, 1994; Rao, 1998).   
 
International Regimes. 
Standards, educational content, and operational practices come together in policy regimes 
that define the terms and content of competition.  These are held within individual and collective 
beliefs; reinforced by normative activity; and embedded in regulatory culture and practices.  
Current environmental issues and policy often cannot be considered outside the context of the 
global commons.  And, where the global commons is concerned, international regimes must be 
engaged.  Recent studies of the dynamics shaping the global environmental sector stress the twin 
factors of increased international organization and global dialogue (Meyer, Frank, Schofer & 
Hironaka, 1997) in driving the passage of environmental treaties and other regulatory 
frameworks (Frank, 1997).  However, in this arena more than any other, the institutionalized 
separation of environmental and economic interests may be the most pronounced.  International 
standards are often established with a clear set of underlying assumptions that place economic 
growth and environmental protection in separate domains with compatible solutions ruled out.  
For example, international accords on fishing fail to protect the world’s rapidly depleting 
fisheries due to short-sighted economic priorities.  Ninety percent of the world’s fish catch is 
taken from coastal waters (Nickerson, 1994) and is, therefore, under some form of government 
control.  But, because governments have invested heavily in protecting domestic fishing 





to pull in $70 billion worth of fish (Nickerson, 1994).  The magnitude of this dysfunctional 
behavior worsens if you include the inefficiency and waste created from “by-catch.”  The FAO 
estimates that 27 million tons of fish per year — about 33 percent of the total catch — were 
discarded dead from fishing boats because they were too small, the wrong species or out of 
season (Sissenwine, 1995).  In 1996, fifteen percent of the yearly take from the Bering Straight 
off the Alaskan coast was by-catch.  This amount of fish equaled 50 million meals, enough to 
treat everyone in the states of California and New York to a fish fry (Economist, 1996). 
While there are several international trade agreements that have environmental 
implications, GATT is by far the oldest and most far reaching. GATT also illustrates how 
institutions perpetuate a separation of environmental and economic interests.  The Global 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created as a branch of the United Nations after 
World War II.  It is both the framework and governing institution over most international trade.  
(In 1995, GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization, or WTO.)  WTO’s central 
premise in establishing fair and free trade is that of “non-discrimination.”  But, the 
environmental implications of this agreement were tested in 1991 with a dispute over dolphin-
free tuna.  The US Department of Commerce imposed an embargo on tuna from Mexico, 
Venezuela, Vanuatu and other countries because the by-catch of dolphins killed in the process of 
harvesting the tuna violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972.   Mexico 
complained to the WTO and won relief.  The adjudicating panel decided that the MMPA was 
inconsistent with the non-discrimination principle.  A country had no right to enforce process 
restrictions on other countries when those processes have no impact on the product itself 





import of shrimp from countries that do not protect endangered sea turtles from deadly 
entrapment in fishing nets (a domestic US requirement), conservation groups pressed the Clinton 
Administration to defy the decision, arguing that the WTO was subverting domestic 
environmental policy (Cushman, 1998). 
Environmental NGOs feel that the underlying logic of these WTO decisions is that 
economic trade is paramount to environmental protection.  As a result, they feel that WTO 
decision-making is based on institutions which challenge national sovereignty in developing 
domestic environmental standards.  They fear that pressure from foreign countries (supported 
by domestically disadvantaged companies) will create pressures to drive domestic 
environmental standards down to the lowest common denominator.  Hard won domestic 
environmental victories may be lost in the name of international trade equity.  Underlying 
this possible outcome is the institutionalized notion that trade interests will rule out any 
attempt at balancing environmental objectives and commercial objective (Ferrantino, 1994). 
 
STRATEGIES FOR OVER-COMING  
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS  
Much current prescriptions for addressing the current trade-offs of the economics and 
environment debate focus on “changing mindsets” — individual, organizational, and other 
(Porter & van der Linde, 1995).  In the institutional perspective we develop in this article, 
“mindsets” are the outcomes of policy arenas, organizational and professional learning, 
technical expertise, international regimes and everyday routines and practices.  They are 





and other rationales that reflect the “common sense” of often quite disparate constituencies: 
government officials, industry managers, accounting and engineering professions, 
environmentalists, and the general public.   
In 1995, nearly three quarters of Americans described themselves as being 
environmentalists.  Sixty-nine percent also believed that environmental protection and 
economic development could go hand-in-hand (Times Mirror, 1995).  While such statistics 
have little bearing on the ease with which we can adjust our behaviors to accommodate such 
espoused beliefs, they represent a key paradox that makes the institutional perspective on the 
economics versus environment debate such a challenge.  The “beliefs” of the American 
public, while having little connection to the technical possibilities related to the issue, 
represent an important consideration in determining the “reality” of the issue.  They represent 
a change in one aspect of the institutional structure that defines the relationship between 
economics and the environment and therefore represent an important component in the 
definition of its overall form.  But, institutions are sedimented, multi-level, and durable 
assemblies.  For these reasons, efforts at institutional change must also incorporate strategies 
that address all aspects of institutions — regulative, normative, and cognitive — and work on 
multiple levels.   
In this section, we will elaborate on two fundamental strategies for overcoming 
institutional barriers and driving change.  First, strategies may work within the present 
framework of the debate.  Second, they may focus on reconfiguring the form and nature of 
the debate.  This distinction can be seen in strategies of various segments of environmental 





collecting donations from corporate sponsors and purchasing ecosystems for their protection. 
 Earth-First uses eco-sabotage (among other strategies) to achieve its goal of zero economic 
and population growth.  The former works within the existing institutional framework.  The 
latter works to change it. 
Applying our institutional framework for understanding this distinction, strategies 
toward reshaping current institutional inertia in the framing of policy issues must involve the 
provision of new norms, models for practice, and underlying expertise that defines the 
problem, its possible solutions, and appropriate interventions. The tools and skills are those 
developed by recent theories of leadership, change, and management (Eccles & Nohria, 
1992) and directed at activity within organizational fields of activity and actors. The 
mechanisms are based on the regulative, normative and cognitive aspects of institutions.  
Debate about which aspects of institutions are “more or most” amenable to change or 
contestability (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 8) must be balanced with an insight from our 
framework that recognizes the inter-relatedness and reinforcing features of the three aspects 
operating together. 
Both change efforts within the existing framework and efforts to restructure the form 
of the debate must focus efforts at deliberate alterations in the regulative and normative 
aspects of institutions, as these are “the products of human design, [and] the outcomes of 
purposive action by instrumentally oriented individuals” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 8).  
They are therefore open to manipulation and change.  However, the alteration of cognitive 
institutions is beyond direct individual control.  Their influence is not always readily 





actors know or wish to acknowledge.  
Our approach treats “taken for granted” as a stable and (time-dependent) claim about 
a dominant logic or model.  But there is seldom a situation where only one cognitive 
institution prevails — though certainly many where one dominates or has primacy (Hoffman, 
1999a).  This of course, recognizes the political and cultural nature of such claims to 
dominance, and underscores the value of identifying contender models or claims even if they 
are currently on the margins of the policy dialogue.  Recognizing this, strategies at the level 
of cognitive institutions involve identifying and supporting alternative models, mobilizing 
competing frames by borrowing or analogy (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay & King, 1991) to 
redefine the terms of the debate, and creating options.   
With this distinction, the temporal implications of the two strategies now become 
clear.  Change within the system will meet with short term results, the result of tinkering 
around the edges of the regulative and normative aspects of institutions.  Restructuring of the 
overall system will require long-time horizons to complete, involving more radical 
challenges to the regulative and normative aspects with the intention of altering beliefs in the 
cognitive aspects.  We will consider each strategy in turn. 
 
Strategies within the Present Framing of the Debate 
The first strategy is to incorporate environmental considerations into the existing 
market, social, economic and political institutions that predominate organizational and 
individual interaction.  This strategy shares features of standard conflict resolution routines, 





economic debates into a common language and rhetoric, by reframing environmental issues 
into terms and models that fit within the existing context.  It requires alterations in the 
regulative and normative aspects of institutional structures in a way that does not challenge 
or undermine the cognitive aspects in place.   
For example, environmental regulation could be restructured to trigger corporate 
environmental action through generally accepted economic means, such as the introduction 
of surrogate or artificial prices in the form of unit taxes, effluent fees, or, more recently, 
market incentives to provide the needed signals to economize on the use of these resources 
(Hahn & Stavins, 1991).  Universities could connect educational programs and 
environmental issues in terms that compliment existing educational curricula.  So, for 
example, management schools could inject environmental issues into the management 
curriculum by teaching it in the language of core business disciplines such as strategy, 
finance, marketing, accounting and organizational behavior (Hoffman, 1999b).  It is a 
strategy based on integration of environmental interests into the business program in such a 
way that it does not challenge the basic precepts of corporate objectives and responsibilities. 
  
Within the corporation, environmental managers could be trained to frame 
environmental management as a business issue that complements the overall business 
strategy (GEMI, 1999).  Traditional business terms such as ROI and NPV could be adopted 
to sell the costs and benefits of environmental initiatives to business management (Shelton & 
Shopley, 1995).  This will trigger organizational initiatives that seek environmental 





can be amended such that environmental interest could be introduced as compatible and 
supportive of pre-existing goals of economic growth and increased world trade.   
 
Strategies for Reconfiguring the Form of the Debate 
Instead of integrating environmental considerations into the existing institutional 
framework, a second strategy is to reconfigure that framework and the form of the debate.  This 
strategy would also involve an alteration of regulative and normative institutions but, unlike the 
previous strategy, would be conducted with an intention of challenging and undermining the 
existing cognitive aspects upon which they are supported.   
This strategy is based on a notion that the integration of environmentalism into present 
day social and economic structures does not fundamentally change the cause of environmental 
problems and therefore will not alter their ultimate outcome (Schnaiberg, 1980; Gladwin et al., 
1994).  Proponents of this notion argue that the environment should not remain external to the 
economy, internalized through the application of norms and rules based principally on human 
utility and not ecological stability (Evernden, 1985).  Instead, they argue that environmental 
issues signal problems for the sustainability of society’s institutions and must therefore be 
interpreted as a signal to change and challenge them. 
For example, changes in environmental policy could reconfigure the role and objectives 
of both oversight agencies and the regulated community.  Such reconfiguration could allow 
flexibility and autonomy for corporations to define which emission sources to control through 
site-specific compliance strategies that achieve broadly defined objectives (Schmitt, 1994).  





stimulating both direct and indirect pressures by changing core business networks, such as 
financial markets, international regimes and consumer demands.  Such programmatic changes 
could trigger new types of organizational responses and eliminate competing institutional 
pressures from multiple constituencies (Hoffman, 1997).  But, they will also challenge cognitive 
aspects of policy, necessitating new forms of relationships and responsibilities between the 
regulators and the regulated community that break down accepted notions of command-and-
control, media based, technology forcing and adversarial based regulation. 
Educational curricula in science, politics and business could be redefined such that 
humans are no longer accorded separate status and a superiority to nature, which itself would no 
longer be viewed as inert, infinitely divisible and moved by external rather than internal forces 
(Gladwin et al., 1995).  Business management (education and practice) could be redefined in a 
way that treats the firm as socially and physically connected to the ecosystem and other 
societies; the profit-motive could be redefined as just one of many prime objectives of the firm, 
and; economic growth could be redefined to include concerns for information intensiveness, 
community consciousness and the experiential quality of economic activity, rather than merely 
its material-energy intensiveness (Daly, 1991; Daly & Cobb, 1994; Gladwin et al., 1994).  And 
finally, international regimes could be restructured in such a way that supplants the imperative 
for global free trade with the economic and environmental sustainability of world communities 
(Rodrik, 1997; Soros, 1998). 
 
Opportunities and Limitations 





over history and embedded into structures, policies, metrics, rhetoric and practice.  In the past 
thirty-five years, a conception of the incompatibility of environmental and economic interests 
has been constructed into the institutions of social structure including environmental policy, 
educational curricula, operational practice and international regimes.  Integrative environmental 
solutions will be difficult to as long as these institutional frameworks prevail.  However, 
breaking the established routines that these institutions perpetuate will invite resistance through 
habitual inertia, threats to established power bases or fear of the unknown  (Mintzberg, 1979).  
The choice between a strategy that integrates environmental issues into present institutional 
structures or a strategy that seeks to reformulate those structures does not alleviate this 
resistance.  But, each strategy also holds unique opportunities and limitations, segregated along 
several dimensions.   
First, working within the existing system will encounter less opposition and face a greater 
chance of short-term success.  By co-opting existing political leaders, prominent businesses and 
leading institutions to “champion” environmental values, social change can be gained 
incrementally towards a more broad scale goal.  For example, world religions are incorporating 
environmental concerns into existing structures of moral behavior and sin.  In 1986, five world 
religions signed the Assisi Declarations, an agreement to attend to environmental concerns 
(Rockefeller & Elder, 1992).  The Presbyterian Church placed environmental concerns into the 
church canon in 1991, making it a sin to “threaten death to the planet entrusted to our care” 
(Associated Press, 1991) and the Catholic church added environmental concerns to its catechism 
(Woodward & Nordland, 1992).  By connecting environmental concerns to accepted notions of 






On the other hand, working within the existing system limits the range of potential 
outcomes to those which are already known and considered palatable by existing social 
constituents.  The second path of challenging the existing institutional system holds a greater 
promise of yielding new structures and beliefs that have yet to be discovered.  But, this strategy 
will encounter stronger opposition, face a greater chance of short-term failure and will take 
longer to succeed.  It is a strategy similar to other fundamental social transformations such as the 
social construction of freedom in early western culture (Patterson, 1991) or the emergence of 
self-interest as a guiding value for human behavior (versus obligation to the general welfare), 
forming a necessary foundation of modern capitalism (Hirschman, 1977).  To fundamentally 
alter institutional structures and fully incorporate environmental issues and interests (Evernden, 
1992) would require a re-examination of the foundations of ethics (Jonas, 1973), technological 
development (Piller, 1991), science, medicine and economics (Capra, 1982) and the basic moral 
precepts of the world’s religions (White, 1967).  By challenging such fundamental institutions, 
resistance will be increased as the change threatens accepted ways of acting and thinking. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Field approaches to institutions and organizations challenge basic assumptions of the 
solitary actor perspective that is central to much behavioral research.  Their arguments offer a 
conceptual framework and claims about institutional mechanisms to develop a cultural account 
of how things happen and why.  We have explored a class of arguments and mechanisms that 





“cultural/structural.”  The substantive topic — environmental issues and the question of mixed-
motives — presents an excellent site to develop these issues:  clear cases where identities and 
interests have taken form and solidified into practices, policies, and positions that comprise and 
reinforce the “mixed motives.”  The very nature of the apparent tradeoffs or mixture of motives 
we see as institutionally-ordered and hence amenable to institutional redefinition. 
But, we have gone further to propose strategies for setting an agenda in support of the 
mixed-motive analysis. We presented a discussion of how to deal analytically with the 
institutional framework that incorporates insights from recent studies in institutional theories of 
strategic action. Our prescriptions for deliberate efforts at change engage a contentious and 
central issue in modern institutional approaches — the nature and possibilities of “action” in 
institutions (see American Behavior Scientist special issue, vol. 40, no. 4).  For although the 
focus in institutional theory is on symbols and meanings and rules, “it is essential that we do not 
lose sight of the human agents who are creating and applying these symbols, interpreting these 
meanings, and formulating, conforming to, disobeying, and modifying these rules” (Scott, 1994: 
60).  The literature must acknowledge “institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio, 1991; Hoffman, 
1999a), actors who possess “the ability to motivate cooperation of other actors by providing 
them with common meanings and identities” (Fligstein, 1997: 397).  Such “social skills” 
combine insights from recent social and cultural theory, incorporate the insights of behavioral 
negotiations research, and find practical strategies in the language and practice of robust action 
(Eccles and Nohria, 1992; Ventresca, 1995).  We now find ourselves in a time and certainly in 
places (management schools) when strategic action is back on the agenda and we have strived in 
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